



**Goldsmiths**  
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

**Sense of agency: theory, measures and applications**

**James Moore**  
**Goldsmiths, University of London**

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**Outline**

- What is the sense of agency?
- How do we measure the sense of agency?
- Theories of sense of agency
- Applications of agency research:
  - Aberrant experiences of agency
  - Human-computer interaction


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# WHAT IS THE 'SENSE OF AGENCY'?

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## What is the 'sense of agency'?

- Agents intentionally make things happen



The image block contains three photographs. The top-left photo shows a man in a natural setting playing a flute. The middle photo shows a boxer in a boxing ring wearing red gloves. The bottom-right photo shows a man with a beard and glasses sitting in a chair, playing a video game with a controller. A small '© BBC ONE' watermark is visible at the bottom of the game player photo.

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## What is the 'sense of agency'?

- Definition:
  - Sense of agency is the conscious experience we have of initiating and controlling our actions in order to influence the outside world

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## What is the 'sense of agency'?

- Characteristics of SoA:




Phenomenologically thin (Haggard, 2005)

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# What is the 'sense of agency'?

- Characteristics of SoA:




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# HOW DO WE MEASURE SENSE OF AGENCY?

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## How do we measure sense of agency?

- Explicit measures - Just ask people!



Farrer and Frith (2002)



Farrer et al (2008)

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
## How do we measure sense of agency?

- Issues:
  - Need to think carefully about the question and the experimental set up
  - Issues around introspective access/accuracy
  - Demand effects

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## How do we measure sense of agency?

- Implicit measures
  - Sensory attenuation paradigms
    - E.g. central cancellation of self-produced tickle (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 1998)




- Intentional binding

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
## How do we measure sense of agency?

- Intentional binding:




Haggard, Clark & Kalogeras (2002) *Nat. Neurosc.*


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
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


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


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


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# How do we measure sense of agency?



Ivanof et al. (2021)

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# THEORIES OF SENSE OF AGENCY

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## Theories of sense of agency

- This experience is malleable
  - Excessive agency: Illusions of control



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## Theories of sense of agency

- Placebo buttons:



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## Theories of sense of agency

– Diminished agency: Automata

Table turning/ tipping



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## Theories of sense of agency

- Malleability suggests sense of agency is not a given
- We are constantly constructing this sense of agency
- What neurocognitive processes do this?

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## Theories of sense of agency

- Sensorimotor prediction?

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## Theories of sense of agency

- The ‘Comparator model’ of sense of agency  
(Frith et al., 2000; Frith, 1992, 2004, 2005).

(From Synofzik et al., 2008)

Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith (2002). *TICS*:

- “**predictions** made by the forward model may be available to awareness”
- “the normal experience of the limb is often based on this **predicted state**, rather than the actual state”

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## Theories of sense of agency

- Postdiction?

The diagram shows a sequence of three images: a human brain, a hand holding a remote control, and a television. A grey arrow starts from the brain, points to the hand holding the remote, and then to the television. A large green curved arrow labeled 'Postdictive' in red text points from the television back to the brain, indicating that the sense of agency is formed after the action is observed.

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## Theories of sense of agency

- **Theory of apparent mental causation** (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999; Wegner, 2002)

The diagram illustrates the theory of apparent mental causation. It shows a flow from 'Unconscious cause of thought' to 'Thought', and from 'Unconscious cause of action' to 'Action'. A dashed box labeled 'Unconscious link' connects the two unconscious causes. A green arrow labeled 'Actual causal path' points from the unconscious causes to the actions. A grey arrow labeled 'Apparent causal path' points from the thoughts to the actions. Above the 'Thought' and 'Action' boxes is a box labeled 'Experience of conscious will'.

© 2002 in Cognitive Sciences

Wegner (2002):


- “We are **not intrinsically informed** of our own authorship and must instead **build it up** virtually out of perceptions and thoughts and actions that we witness in consciousness”
- “It is as though reflecting on the reasons for our actions can prompt us to include stray, misleading, and non-optimal information in our **post-action assessments**”

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## Theories of sense of agency

- Maybe sense of agency dependent on BOTH prediction and postdiction?

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## Theories of sense of agency


- Predictive and postdictive processes use different **sources** of information
  - Predictive: internal information generated by motor system
  - Postdictive: external feedback about the movement
- Is sense of agency based on the **optimal integration** of these different sources of information?

(Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012)

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## Theories of sense of agency

- Cue integration in human perception
  - Perceptual estimate: weighted sum of individual sensory estimates




Ernst & Banks (2002)

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## Theories of sense of agency

- Does the same apply to SoA?



(Moore, Wegner & Haggard, 2009; Moore & Fletcher, 2012)

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**WHY DOES SENSE OF AGENCY MATTER?  
APPLICATIONS...**


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# ABERRANT EXPERIENCE OF AGENCY

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## Aberrant experience of agency

- Schizophrenia:
  - Passivity symptoms (delusions of control):




'The force moved my lips. I began to speak. The words were made for me' (Frith, 1992)

'When I reach my hand for the comb it is my hand and arm which move, and my fingers pick up the pen, but I don't control them' (Mellor, 1970)

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## Aberrant experience of agency


- Aberrant sense of agency in schizophrenia: a deficit in prediction? (Blakemore, Wolpert & Frith, 2002)



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## Aberrant experience of agency

- Probabilistic relationship between key press and tone




Voss et al (2010)

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## Aberrant experience of agency

- Results



Voss et al (2010)

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## Aberrant experience of agency

- Summary:
  - Absence of prediction in schizophrenia
  - Increased postdiction in schizophrenia
  - May help explain passivity symptoms

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
## Aberrant experience of agency

- Autism:
  - Evidence for difficulties in self-other distinction (Brass & Wiersema, 2021)
  - Mixed evidence for self-agency processing issues e.g. David et al (2008) – no evidence of impairment/ Sperduti et al. (2014) – evidence of impairment
  - Predictive processing framework: is prediction a core deficit in autism (Pellicano & Burr, 2012)?

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
## Aberrant experience of agency

- Intentional binding and force matching



Finnemann et al., (2021)

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## Aberrant experience of agency

- Summary:
  - Predictive processes in sense of agency were unimpaired in those with autism diagnosis
  - What about in a social context?

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# HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION

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## Human-computer interaction

- The feeling of control matters when we are interacting with computers



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## Human-computer interaction



*Support internal locus of control. Experienced operators strongly desire the sense that they are in charge of the system and that the system responds to their actions.*  
(Schneiderman, 1987)

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## Human-computer interaction



**What effect do novel input modalities have on sense of agency?**



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## Human-computer interaction

- Skinput:



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## Human-computer interaction

- Our skinput device:





Coyle et al., (2012)



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## Human-computer interaction

- We compared intentional binding with Skinput vs. Keyboard


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Coyle et al., (2012)

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## Human-computer interaction

- Results:

	Action binding	Outcome binding	Total binding
<b>Button</b>	6.81ms (45.6ms)	-36.11ms (45.46ms)	42.92ms (67.43ms)
<b>Skin-based</b>	29.66ms (42.84ms)	-79.82ms (91.23ms)	109.47ms (74.54ms)



Coyle et al., (2012).

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## Human-computer interaction

- Result: SoA is **increased** for Skinput vs. Keyboard
- Why?
  - Don't know
  - Presence of additional sensory information from stationary (target) limb?
  - Are self-targeted actions psychologically unique?

Coyle et al., (2012)

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
## Human-computer interaction

- Speech:




Limerick et al., (2015).

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## Human-computer interaction

- Sense of agency **reduced** for speech interface
- Surprising given popularity of speech interfaces?
- Does the interaction need to be “social”?

Limerick et al., (2015).

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
## Human-computer-interaction

- Haptics and agency in VR




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# Human-computer interaction



a)




b)

Evangelou et al (2021)

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# Human-computer interaction

Trial sequence x36 per block



**1) With haptic**  
2. without haptic

**1) 0ms**  
2. 50ms latency  
3. 100ms latency  
4. 150ms latency

**Two DVs**

1) **Intentional binding (implicit)**


1) **Self-report Likert scale (explicit)**

Every 12 trials asked:


- "I feel in control of the hand movement"
- "I feel I am causing the sound"

Evangelou et al (2021)

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## Human-computer interaction

- Summary
  - Implicit – significant impact of haptics at longer action-outcome delays
    - Haptics useful with agentic uncertainty?
  - Explicit – haptics protects against negative effect of latency on self-reported agency

Evangelou et al (2021)

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## OVERALL SUMMARY


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## Overall summary

- Sense of agency
  - Definition
  - Phenomenologically thin
  - Distinction between feeling and judgement of agency
- Measures
  - Explicit vs. implicit measures
- Applications
  - Aberrant experiences of agency e.g. SCZ and autism
  - Human-computer interaction

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